Does Your Business Need a Patent Audit?

A patent audit evaluates and reports on the status of your business’ technology protection program.  A patent audit outlines considerations relevant to your ability to secure, protect and enforce your patent rights and, if desired, provides an appraisal of the value of these rights. You can save significant money by doing some preliminary research to clearly describe product ideas before engaging into patent attorney services by using a patent database search solution.

To know if you need a patent audit, consider:

  • Does your business have a portfolio of patents and do you have the original patents?
  • Does your business have a migration plan for expanding its technology and do you manage the protection of the new technology?
  • Does your business use its patented technology out of the country and is this technology patented where it is used?
  • Does your business use patented technology of others and do you have copies of these authorizations?
  • Does your business permit others to use your patented technology and do you have copies of these authorizations?
  • Does your business rely upon employees or independent contractors to create improved technologies and do you have the agreements that cover these relationships?

Your answers to these questions will indicate if it is time to contact an IP audit specialist to ask about a patent audit.

Does Your Business Need a Copyright Audit?

A copyright audit evaluates and reports on the status of your business’ copyrightable works of art.  An audit outlines considerations relevant to your ability to secure, protect and enforce your rights and, if desired, provides an appraisal of the dollar value of these rights.

To know if you need a copyright audit, consider:

  • Does your business rely on copyrightable works of art (writings, images, drawings, computer programs, photographs) and do you have certificates of copyright registration for these works?
  • Does your business use copyrightable works of art for ancillary business activities (marketing, advertising, website images, product descriptions, product manuals) and do you have certificates of copyright registration for these work?
  • Does your business use works of art from others and do you have copies of these written authorizations?
  • Does your business have the right to enforce the copyright rights you are authorized to use?
  • Does your business authorize others to use works of art and do you have copies of these authorizations?

Your answers to these questions will indicate if it is time to contact an IP audit specialist to discuss a copyright audit. If you have had an audit already and  need marketing guidance visit Victorious.

Federal Circuit Weighs In on Step One of Two-Step Inter Partes Review Procedure

In St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Div. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 110 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2014), the Federal Circuit, almost predictably, declined to consider a denied petition to institute an inter partes review (IPR) filed by St. Jude Medical.  In rendering its decision, the Federal Circuit followed the language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which states that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”

While Section 314(d) might have been the only reasoning needed to decide the case, the Federal Circuit included additional discussion regarding the two-step nature of IPRs: step one comprising the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director’s decision whether to institute the IPR; and step two comprising a decision under § 318(a) by the Patent and Trial Appeal Board regarding patentability after conducting the IPR proceeding (i.e., a final written decision).  See, e.g., Belkin Int’l, Inc. v. Kappos, 696 F.3d 1379, 104 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). (It may be noteworthy that Belkin involved an inter partes re-examination, yet the Federal Circuit used this case as the basis for the two-step nature of IPR.)

Under 35 U.S.C. § 319, the Board’s decision under § 318(a) (i.e., after the Director’s decision and the IPR is in motion) is appealable.  It appears that the Federal Circuit included this discussion to highlight its view that the Director’s decision whether to institute an IPR is not considered to be a “final written decision” of the Board under § 318(a).  Moreover, to clear up any confusion, the court observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit after appeal from, inter alia, IPR) did not provide jurisdiction to review the Director’s decision.  Rather, § 1295(a)(4)(A), similar to 35 U.S.C. § 319, refers to final Board decisions under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), according to the court.

The court was careful to point out that its decision followed the Director’s decision regarding a formality issue of a late IPR petition, but would likely apply to all decisions of the Director on whether to institute an IPR.

Interestingly, on the same day, the Federal Circuit also denied petitions for mandamus related to the Director’s decisions regarding IPR requests by two different parties – Dominion Dealer Solutions, and Procter & Gamble Co.  Dominion sought review of the Director’s decision not to institute several of its IPR requests.  See In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC, 749 F.3d 1379, 110 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2014).  Conversely, Procter & Gamble, as patent owner, sought mandamus for review of the Director’s decision to institute an IPR request.  See In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 110 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2014).  In its denial of mandamus of these cases, the Federal Circuit cited similar reasoning as was set forth in the St. Jude Medical decision.  It is noteworthy that Dominion Dealer Solutions had concurrently sought review of the Director’s decision not to institute an IPR in the Eastern District of Virginia in addition to its mandamus petitions.  See Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. Lee, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54350 (E.D. Va. April 18, 2014).  This District Court action failed as well.

In light of the St. Jude Medical decision, it is important to ensure that IPR petitions are timely filed, complete and accurate, and meet § 314(a) subject matter threshold limitations (i.e., “a reasonable likelihood” of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims).  A variety of guidance is available on threshold issues in the form of representative Board decisions to institute IPR proceedings, though detailed discussion of this guidance is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2012-00026 Decision to Institute, Paper 17, Dec. 21, 2012; Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs LLC, IPR2012-00001 Decision to Institute, Paper 15, Jan. 9, 2013; Microstrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034 Decision to Institute, Paper 22, Apr. 22, 2013.

St. Jude Medical carries special significance for parties currently accused of infringing a patent in a District Court that are deciding whether to file an IPR request.  In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) prohibits IPR requests beyond one year after an infringement complaint, including counterclaims alleging infringement.  See St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. v. Volcano Corp., IPR2013-00258 (PTAB 2013); Accord Healthcare v. Eli Lilly and Co., IPR2013-00356 (PTAB 2013).  Passing beyond that one-year threshold is a basis for the Director denying the institution of an IPR; which decision is unappealable.

Accordingly, if you are approaching the § 315(b) deadline for filing an IPR petition, you should carefully craft your petition so that it meets the § 314(a) threshold, and it isn’t determined to be defective due to informalities.  In certain cases a defective petition can be fixed to address formalities, while the filing date of the original petition is accorded.  See, e.g., Macauto U.S.A. v. Baumeister & Ostler GmbH & Co., IPR2012-00004, Notice of Defective Petition, Paper 6, Sept. 21, 2012.  In other situations, where the defect may affect the substance of the petition, a new petition filing date may be accorded when the defect is corrected.  See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation Ltd., IPR2012-00022, Notice of Incomplete Petition, Paper 5, Sept. 27, 2012 (requiring correction of Exhibits).

Does Your Business Need a Trademark Audit?

A trademark audit evaluates and reports on the status of your business’ trademarks and related name rights.  An audit outlines considerations relevant to your ability to secure, protect and enforce your rights and, if desired, provides an appraisal of the dollar value of these rights.

To know if you need a trademark audit, consider:

  • Does your business use a brand name for your goods or services, has this brand name been registered and can you locate these registrations?
  • Does your business use different names for its goods and services, have these names been registered and can you locate these registrations?
  • Does your business use its brand name as your domain name and do you have confirmation of your domain name registration?
  • Does your business use a domain name and has that domain name been registered?
  • Does your business do business out of the United States and are your names registered in the countries where you do business?
  •  Does your business use the names of others and do you have copies of the authorizations to use those names?

Your answers to these questions will indicate if it is time to contact an IP audit specialist to ask about a trademark audit.

Does Your Business Need a Trade Secret Audit?

A trade secret audit evaluates and reports on the status of your business’ trade secrets.  A trade secret audit outlines considerations relevant to your ability to secure, protect and enforce your trade secrets and, if desired, provides an appraisal of the value of these trade secrets.

To know if you need a trade secret audit, consider:

  • Does your business rely on information that is not readily known to others and that provides a business advantage over your competitors and do you require a confidential disclosure agreement to be signed to see such information?
  • Does your business have and maintain a trade secret program?
  • Does your business monitor terminated employees, the single largest reason trade secrets are lost?
  • Does your business permit others to examine and use your trade secrets, do you require a use license and do you have copies of these agreements?
  • Does your business use trade secretsof others and do you require maintenance of these outside trade secrets?
  • Do you have copies of authorizations to examine and use the trade secrets of others?

Your answers to these questions will indicate if it is time to contact an IP audit specialist to ask about a trade secret audit.

The Secret to Success: Use of Trade Secrets Warrants Damages Equal to License Price

On April 22, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the use of trade secrets warrants damages equal to the license price, not the purchase price.

Grail Semiconductor, Inc. invented a new, faster microchip.  The chip used induction to collect electric charges and accelerate computer processes.  Grail discussed the induction technology in 2001 with Mitsubishi Electric, Inc.  Mitsubishi signed a nondisclosure agreement and attended a presentation, but refused to invest.  Mitsubishi’s subsidiary then began to manufacture products with the same inductive design only three years later.

Damages for the breach of a nondisclosure agreement typically reflect the stolen property’s value.  “Value,” however, is a vague term.  It might mean 1) purchase price; 2) projected royalties; or 3) actual profits.  The jury defined “value” as the purchase price.  It awarded around $123 million, the amount for which Grail could sell the technology.  Its calculations reflected projected profits in Grail’s business plan.

However, the jury’s calculation method was not valid.  The appellate court held in Grail Semiconductor Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc., case number 1-07-CV098590, that damages should reflect the price to license the product, not purchase it.  Mainly, Grail could lease the technology to other companies, despite the misappropriation.  The technology, therefore, retained most of its value; Grail and Mitsubishi were the only two companies that knew it.

Furthermore, the court refused to grant a JNOV as Mitsubishi was still liable – it just owed less money.  It also said that damages were a sufficient remedy, though the nondisclosure agreement required an injunction.  Ultimately, it ordered a new trial so a different jury could correctly compute damages.

Consequently, the improper use of trade secrets may warrant fewer damages than disclosure. Plaintiffs who sue for the illicit use of trade secrets may need to consider accepting lower settlement offers.  They might also want to describe a marketing strategy for which mere use of a trade secret completely impairs its value.

Whose Name Is It Anyway?

Rapper William Leonard Roberts II, professionally known as Rick Ross, was recently the victor in a legal dispute with former drug trafficker Ricky D. Ross over the use of Roberts’ stage name.

According to the California Court of Appeal’s Dec. 23, 2013, opinion in Ross v. Roberts, et al., plaintiff Ricky D. Ross, also known as “Freeway Rick Ross,” rose to infamy in the 1980s as he ruled the West Coast while overseeing a multimillion-dollar cocaine trafficking enterprise and became a street legend.  Ross’ network packaged and transported cocaine directly into at least six states and indirectly into many others.  He was the subject of the Black Entertainment Television true-crime documentary series “American Gangster,” which profiled the rise and fall of certain criminals.

Defendant Roberts admittedly lived a different life.  He is a successful recording artist who is professionally known as Rick Ross.  Although Roberts, through his lyrics and music, has created a fictional image of a cocaine-trafficking gangster, he in fact attended college on a football scholarship and was once a correctional officer.  He later signed a record deal with Island Def Jam, a major record label known for breaking hip-hop superstars such as Kanye West and Jeezy.

While in jail, Ross read a magazine article about up-and-coming rappers and learned of Roberts’ use of the stage name Rick Ross.  In 2010, Ross sued Roberts, his record label and several other parties in California state court for allegedly misappropriating his name and likeness to further Roberts’ rap music career.  Ruling that the First Amendment protected Roberts’ creative expression, the state court judge granted summary judgment in his favor.

California, like most jurisdictions, recognizes that “the right of publicity protects an individual’s right to profit from the commercial value of his her identity.”  Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball (2001) 94 Cal.App. 4th 400, 4009.  California also recognizes a statutory right of publicity. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387, 391 (Comedy III).  California Civil Code § 3344(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”

The appellate court in Ross, citing the California Supreme Court’s analysis in Comedy III, applied the transformative test and chose to “ ‘balance’ the right of a celebrity to control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness . . .  against another individual’s right to free expression under the First Amendment.”  The application of the transformative test seeks to determine “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message.”  It looks at “whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.

Comedy III involved a visual artist who sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing the faces of the Three Stooges.  The transformative test became whether the use of celebrity likeness “is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”  Relying on Comedy III, the Ross court also noted that First Amendment protection extends not only to visual expressions but to all forms of expression, including written and spoken words and music.

In Ross, the court acknowledged that Roberts’ “work — his music and persona as a rap musician—relies to some extent on plaintiff’s name and persona.  Roberts chose to use the name ‘Rick Ross.’  He raps about trafficking in cocaine and brags about his wealth. These were ‘raw materials’ from which Roberts’ music career was synthesized. But these are not the ‘very sum and substance’ of Roberts’ work.”

Further, “Roberts created a celebrity identity, using the name Rick Ross, of a cocaine kingpin turned rapper.  He was not simply an imposter seeking to profit solely off the name and reputation of Rick Ross. Rather, he made music out of fictional tales of dealing drugs and other exploits— some of which related to plaintiff.  Using the name and certain details of an infamous criminal’s life as basic elements, he created original artistic works.”

Simply, Roberts’ fictional entertainment persona was found to be transformative.  So the answer to the question of whose name is it anyway is both Ross and Roberts.

But For Trademark Parody – Jovial Jabs or Bad for the Brand?

In the somewhat murky world of trademark parody disputes, various courts often are torn as to how to best reach the appropriate decision. Such uncertainty, among other PR and business considerations, often leads some plaintiffs to ponder whether they might have been better off having a good chuckle and ignoring tongue-in-cheek brands in their space rather than marching into court.

However, since lawyers typically aren’t paid for public relations consultations, judge for yourself how these parties faired as we look at some common themes of interesting trademark parody cases decided over the past few years worth some light-hearted discussion.  If you don’t crack a smile reading about these cases, and the creative minds behind them, definitely stick to reading legal treatises.

At the outset, it is important to distinguish between what is parody and what is not.  Although sometimes confused with sarcasm and/or satire, both of which lean toward derision, parody is different and often looked upon more favorably in our culture, likely due to its joviality.  Where trademark law often becomes intertwined, is that for parody to work it necessarily relies upon an interrelationship to a prior known object or text giving meaning and the basis for the presumed humor.  However, those prior known text/object owners often choose not to laugh off the jovial jab, instead bringing trademark infringement suits claiming likelihood of consumer confusion.

To begin our analysis of this unique brand of cases, we need look no further than the recent final appeal decision that concluded a 12-year dispute between Starbucks and Black Bear Micro Roastery’s “Charbucks” blend.  Impressively, the defendant weathered the bitter battle and prevailed, with the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals determining there was no sufficient finding of likelihood of consumer confusion through blurring of Starbucks brand.  See Starbucks Corp., et al. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc. d/b/a Black Bear Micro Roastery (2nd Cir. 2013).  In the final analysis, a survey of 600 people became a key piece of evidence showing that less than 5 percent of consumers thought they could actually buy “Charbucks” blend at Starbucks stores.

One case worth noting that slid past most people — although it is admittedly somewhat juvenile and without rulings on the merits — illustrates what may come of similar disputes between parties with significant market disparity.  Not long ago, a teenage boy had a great idea.  What if he mocked some really popular clothing brand, and then sold it to those amused by the obviously humorous contrast?  Brilliant!  Sort of.  As evidenced in The North Face Apparel Corp. v. The South Butt, initiated in 2009, a teenager did just that and started a clothing brand by flipping the iconic half-dome curves of the North Face logo upside down.  The North Face was not amused.

After several cease-and-desist letters did not garner the desired effect, nor did their success in an opposition to prevent The South Butt from gaining trademark registration, The North Face sued The South Butt in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging trademark infringement in addition to drawing sizable amounts of public awareness.  In The South Butt’s answer to the complaint, the teenager’s lawyers somewhat accurately quipped “[b]ut for the actions of North Face, the South Butt saga might have been relegated to local Friday fish-fry banter.”

The case did not get to the merits before a confidential settlement was worked out in 2010 and The North Face made it go away.  However, one wonders if The North Face would have been better off laughing this one off after a quiet victory at the trademark office, particularly once articles about the lawsuit made national news and the company ended up filing another suit a few years later to enforce the settlement because The South Butt’s product apparently was still in demand.

A more recent battle, where the humorist ultimately won the war, is the Facebook-Lamebook dispute.  Graphic designers in Austin, Texas, established Lamebook to out all those who end up oversharing (i.e., TMI) on Facebook.  The idea behind the launch of the site was to showcase the funniest and lamest of Facebook and get public feedback, arguably as a means for social commentary of modern society.  As with The South Butt dispute, Facebook went after Lamebook by alleging trademark infringement and dilution and requesting that Lamebook cease and desist.  However, Lamebook took the offensive in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas and filed a declaratory judgment that it did not violate Facebook’s rights. Lamebook claimed it was protected as a parody under the First Amendment.  Ultimately, the two came to an agreement in 2011 allowing the Lamebook site to continue its mission and provide revenues to its founders, albeit without its own federal registrations and with a disclaimer on its homepage.

What can we glean from these and other similar cases?  Parody is not really an affirmative defense to trademark infringement, although it may be a means to show lack of likelihood of confusion. Rather, parody is an assertion of First Amendment rights concerning noncommercial speech for the most part.   Thus, one should pay careful attention to the reasons and target chosen to be mocked.

Trademark infringement issues surrounding confusion are more likely to be excused where there is an artistic or social message behind the parody and not mere commercial interests.  Further, the allegedly infringed mark itself ideally should be the interrelated element for the parody defense under the First Amendment.  Despite the above, it would appear the courts do not take themselves too seriously on the matter with various circuits taking slightly different approaches to get to the most amicable results.

Software Turns to the Supremes for Guidance

After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) had two bites at the apple to set forth a useful analytical framework on the proper analysis regarding subject matter eligibility of software patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (panel and rehearing en banc decisions here), petitioners have taken their case to the great Supremes and they in turn granted the writ of certiorari earlier this month.

The CAFC’s May en banc decision was so conflicted with differing approaches at odds with U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) and CAFC precedent that it left petitioners little choice but to petition the high court for some meaningful guidance.  It is particularly telling that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office responded shortly after the May decision to make clear that despite the decision potentially spelling the end of software patents, “no change in examination procedure for evaluating subject matter eligibility” would be incorporated by its examining corps since consensus in the CAFC decision was lacking.

In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Intl., SCOTUS is presented with the following question: “Whether claims to computer-implemented inventions – including claims to systems and machines, processes, and items of manufacture – are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this [Supreme] Court?”

The specific invention at issue in Alice Corp. relates to computers and hardware configured to run with software to collectively create a computerized trading platform that manages risk between two parties conducting a financial transaction.  The claims utilize variations of this concept through methods, apparatuses, and systems.  After stops at the district court and the CAFC, the methods, apparatus, and systems claims are presently regarded as ineligible subject matter under § 101.

Petitioners argue that CAFC Judge Lourie’s lead opinion in the en banc decision is inconsistent with SCOTUS precedent.  Specifically, Lourie analyzed § 101 by asking (1) whether the subject matter falls within the four classes of subject matter and, if so, (2) whether “the claim pose[s] any risk of preempting an abstract idea[.]”  Petitioners argue that in analyzing prong (2), Lourie picks and chooses portions of a claim in isolation to identify potentially abstract ideas that would prevent the claim as a whole from being eligible subject matter, thereby conflicting with SCOTUS precedent as to the proper § 101 analysis.

Citing CAFC Chief Judge Rader’s dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part opinion for support, petitioners point out that § 101 is intentionally broad and thus devoid of any reference to software being foreclosed from patent protection.  Accordingly, petitioners argue that the proper analysis focuses on whether the “claim as a whole” as taught by SCOTUS in Diehr (and later confirmed in Bilski) is directed toward “an abstract idea.”  If the opposite were true, isolated portions of a claim that potentially recite an abstract idea would risk rendering the claim on the whole as ineligible subject matter.  Because a claim typically “can be stripped down . . . until at its core, something that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed,” Lourie’s standard from the lead opinion threatens to undermine eligibility of not just software but all claims that utilize one or more potentially abstract ideas (nearly every invention arguably builds upon some form of an abstract idea) even if the claims otherwise satisfy §§101, 102, 103, and 112.

In their Opposition Brief, respondents look to Mayo for support arguing that § 101 should be analyzed by “first identifying the abstract idea . . . and then asking, what else is there in the claims?” In other words, each element of a claim is analyzed in isolation as to its “abstractness” and all remaining features are similarly examined in isolation to determine whether the isolated features when combined are “sufficient to transform the nature of the claim.”  On its face, this approach appears to conflict with Diehr in that it “dissects the claims into . . . elements and ignore[s] the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”

Respondents also delve into constructing the inventive concept of petitioners’ claims citing Bilski for justification, which adds further tension to the § 101 analysis and the appropriateness of analyzing the merits of a claimed invention, including novelty and obviousness, in the context of subject matter eligibility.

Interested parties including the software community, practitioners in the field, and even the solicitor general hope SCOTUS will respond decisively to this intra-circuit split with some semblance of a decipherable analytical framework for subject matter eligibility of software patents. Such a decision will resolve the uncertainty in the industry and the concomitant impact such uncertainty caused.

The Benefits of an Intellectual Property Value Assessment

Every established company and start-up business should have an intellectual property value assessment performed by a patent attorney.  This assessment should be done by an attorney and firm that the company does not regularly use.  There are three primary reasons:

First, a company’s regular attorney must avoid offending anyone in management and must avoid being accused of wasting management’s time.

Second, a different pair of eyes will see property rights that could be overlooked without a fresh appraisal.

Third, it is not realistic to expect an attorney to find fault with his or her own work.

To be assured of a neutral appraisal, a company should consider a contract that prohibits the appraisal attorney from soliciting the company’s ongoing IP work.

Intellectual property is a higher percentage of the value of most companies today and with an IP assessment this value can become part of a private company’s pro forma balance sheet.  This increases the incentive for and value of an IP appraisal.

Invariably there are areas of IP that are overlooked.  For example, few companies regularly register copyrights in the copyrightable materials they produce or others produce for the company.   A company’s website is often not protected.  This is an asset of considerable value, which is vulnerable without a copyright registration. While copyrightable material can be protected after the fact of infringement, the remedies available are severely limited.   A company employee can be trained in a matter of hours to recognize copyrightable material, make sure contracts with third parties assign their copyrightable content to the company, and prepare and file copyright applications on all significant copyrightable property.  An electronically filed copyright application can be filed in minutes for a $30 filing fee.  Other examples of unprotected IP assets are legion.  An IP appraisal will expose many of these areas and propose solutions.

An IP appraisal that adds to a company’s pro forma balance sheet requires close cooperation with an existing or specialized CPA knowledgeable about intellectual property valuation.

An effective IP appraisal requires close cooperation by company personnel.  This is best obtained by giving a high-level employee authority to request research and records from the company’s departments.  That employee can also decide when the IP appraisal raises questions that require a strategic decision by the company’s management committee or a body with equivalent decision-making power.

The initial IP assessment requires a significant allocation of personnel time and attorney’s fees.  To avoid nasty surprises, the assessment should be done in two phases.  The first phase will identify existing protected assets and all areas where IP assets are not protected.  At that point it should be possible to ask the appraisal attorney to perform the assessment and deliver the complete report and recommendations for a fixed fee. Once the initial assessment report is complete it should be updated at least annually, but the incremental cost should be modest.  To the extent the appraisal recommends additional IP protection – as an example, for patent applications — the cost typically can be fixed in an advance retainer agreement. The company can then decide on a case-by-case basis whether the cost is justified by the value of the protected intellectual property.