AI Art and Copyright in the Unites States

While AI art has been around for a few years, late 2022 saw incredible advances, especially after Stability AI released its open source Stable Diffusion tool. Now, consumers have access to a variety of AI art tools, not only tools based on Stable Diffusion, but also with proprietary models from OpenAI (Dall-E 2) and Midjourney (Midjourney, which combines its own proprietary model enhanced with Stable Diffusion). 

The widespread adoption of these cutting-edge technological tools comes with many legal questions.

Can You Copyright AI Art?

In the United States, one must own a copyright registration before initiating a lawsuit.[1] But can you obtain a registration on AI art?

The U.S. Copyright Office will not issue a registration if the only listed author is non-human “machine.” See Refusal to Register A Recent Entrance to Paradise.[2]

But what if the listed author is not a machine?

The Copyright Office issued an opinion on February 21, 2023 as to the registrability of a comic book called Zarya of the Dawn, which used AI art generated by Midjourney. The text and the selection and arrangement of images and text of the comic book was subject to copyright protection by the author, Kristina Kashtanova, but the images generated by Midjourney were not.

While the author entered text prompts to generate the images, because Midjourney “generate[d] images in a…way” that was unpredictable to the author,” the author lacked sufficient control over generated images to be treated as the ‘master mind’ behind them.” The Copyright Office was not persuaded that Midjourney was a tool akin to Photoshop,[3] because when artists use tools like Photoshop, “they select what visual material to modify, choose which tools to use and what changes to make, and take specific steps to control the final image such that it amounts to the artist’s ‘own original mental conception, to which [they] gave visible form.’” The fact that the author expended significant time and effort working with Midjourney—for example, regenerating images over and over to find a suitable result to use—such work did not involve the “minimum creative spark” necessary for authorship. The author’s edits to a couple of the images in Photoshop were also deemed “too minor and imperceptible to supply the necessary creativity for copyright protection.”

As it did not appear to be an argument put forth to the Copyright Office, it is unclear whether Midjourney, Inc. itself could claim copyright over the images its tool generates, as Midjourney not only trained its own tool, but has continually fine-tuned the tool using its own proprietary methods. This question may be relevant because Midjourney’s terms of services grants certain paid users, subject to certain exceptions, all rights to the generated images. If Midjourney can be deemed the author of the generated images, can it assign those rights to its paid users?

Many questions remain, such as authorship of images created from one’s own trained model (or embeddings or other trained file types), the degree of alteration of an AI art image needed to constitute a minimum creative spark for registrability, and ownership of resulting images when your own image or sketch is used as the base (e.g., img2img or ControlNet methods).

As more authors apply for copyright registrations for underlying work that incorporates AI art, it will be interesting to see what can be registered.

On March 16, 2023, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a new registration guidance on works incorporating AI art. It recognized that additional copyright issues have not been addressed, but that it has “launched an agency-wide initiative to delve into a wide range of these issues. Among other things, the Office intends to publish a notice of inquiry later this year seeking public input on additional legal and policy topics, including how the law should apply to the use of copyrighted works in AI training and the resulting treatment of outputs.”

Does AI Art Constitute Copyright Infringement?

Two copyright infringement lawsuits have been filed that may lead to decisions on whether the use of AI art models that use copyrighted images for training purposes constitute copyright infringement:

  • Andersen et al. v. Stability AI Ltd. et al., Case no. 3:23-cv-00201 before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, and
  • Getty Images (US), Inc. v. Stability AI, Inc., Case no. 1:23-cv-00135-GBW before the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Stable Diffusion was trained using a dataset of 5.85 filtered image-text pairs, namely, the LAION-5B dataset. The dataset, scraped from the internet, consists of an index of the URLs to publicly-available images, together with the ALT texts associated with the images, regardless of any associated copyright status of such images, and regardless of whether the images contained watermarks. But while the Stable Diffusion model was trained on these image-text pairs, none of the images are actually stored in the resulting model, as the images were used only in the training process.

The LAION-5B dataset includes images by the artist plaintiffs[4] in the Andersen case, as well as watermarked images from Getty Images. The inclusion of these copyrighted images in the training data is the basis for the direct copyright infringement claims. Whether infringement exists will likely hinge on whether the defendants’ use constitute fair use. A fair use analysis is a highly factual one that generally takes into account the purpose and character of the use, the nature of plaintiff’s work, the amount and substantiality of the portion of plaintiff’s work used, and the effect of defendant’s use on the market for, or value of, plaintiff’s work. 

Both cases also advance the claim that the defendants removed copyright management information from the source images in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). As the LAION-5B dataset links to the source images, and the resulting models do not actually contain the source images, it is not entirely clear how copyright management information has been removed or altered.[5] If such information was indeed removed or altered solely for training purposes, and not otherwise made available to the public, it will be interesting to see whether Section 1202(b) will nevertheless apply.

The Andersen case also alleges a vicarious copyright infringement claim; namely, that “imposters” have relied on using an artist’s name to create AI art that can pass as original works by that artist that are then sold. Plaintiffs have not yet provided specific examples of these alleged “fakes,” but this theory seeks to hold defendants Stability AI, Midjourney, and DeviantArt responsible for end user use.

Both cases also assert non-copyright claims, such as violations of publicity rights (Andersen), unfair competition (both), and trademark infringement and dilution (Getty Images).

We will be tracking these cases and provide updates as they progress, as well as any proposed legislations that may affect AI art.


[1] 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 203 L. Ed. 2d 147, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). No registration is required to issue a DMCA takedown notice (17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)), though if the respondent files a counter notice, the copyright owner must file a lawsuit within 14 days, or the allegedly infringing matter will be reinstated (17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)).

[2] This opinion is being challenged as part of Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case no. 1:22-cv-01564 before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The parties have filed summary judgment motions that have not been ruled upon.

[3] Note that Photoshop itself contains certain proprietary AI tools, though Adobe has yet to release an AI tool that creates an entire image from scratch. A “portrait generator” that can “generate unique photo realistic faces based on characteristics you specify” has been teased with no pending release date.

[4] The Andersen case involves a class action complaint, but as it is still in the early stages of litigation, the class has not yet been certified.

[5] As part of the training process for the original baseline model of Stable Diffusion, images were, however, cropped to a standard square aspect ratio and size for uniformity. The cropped versions of the images have not been made available to the public.

Andy Warhol’s Prince Series and Issues of Transformativeness in Visual Works

Author: Brady Hagan

The Supreme Court will soon decide a case that, according to the appellants, could cause “a sea-change in the law of copyright” and cast “a cloud of legal uncertainty over an entire genre of visual art.” Indeed, the Court is expected soon to decide Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, a case expected (and hoped by some) to refine the meaning of “transformative use,” a part of fair use analysis, as applied to visual works in copyright infringement lawsuits, an issue on which the Second and Ninth Circuits have split. The key issue in Goldsmith is whether a work of visual art was sufficiently transformative of a photograph it was based on to constitute fair use.

In 1981, photographer Lynn Goldsmith took a photograph of acclaimed pop artist Prince in her studio (the “Photo”). Later, in 1984, Goldsmith licensed the Photo to Vanity Fair for use as an artistic reference.1 Unbeknownst to her, the artist hired by Vanity Fair was pop-art artist Andy Warhol. Vanity Fair’s license allowed it to publish an illustration of the Photo, once as a full page and once again as a quarter page, with co-attribution to Goldsmith. Vanity Fair’s use of the Photograph was thus authorized by Goldsmith, the copyright holder. However, Warhol would independently, and without license from Goldsmith, use the Photo as the subject matter of his Prince Series, rendering the image sixteen times in his characteristic style of sharp, contrasting colors and deep shading, typified by his works like Marilyn Diptych (1962) and Campbell’s Soup Can (1962). The most famous of the Prince Series is a work called Orange Prince, contrasted with the original photo below:

The Prince Series remained part of Warhol’s private collection until he passed away in 1987, at which point much of his life’s work was transferred to The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. (“the Warhol Foundation”), a non-profit whose mission is “the advancement of the visual arts.” In furtherance of its purpose, the Warhol Foundation donated the Prince Series for exhibition many times to such museum venues as the Museum of Modern Art, Tate, and The Andy Warhol Museum.

Goldsmith finally learned of the Prince Series after Prince’s death in 2016, when publisher Condé Nast (owner of Vanity Fair), published a commemorative edition magazine reflecting on the star’s life, and in which it used a print from Warhol’s Series, crediting the Warhol Foundation while failing to credit Goldsmith. Goldsmith notified the Warhol Foundation that she regarded it as being in violation of her copyright. The Warhol Foundation responded by suing Goldsmith in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking declaratory judgment that the Prince Series works did not infringe Goldsmith’s exclusive rights in violation of the U.S. Copyright Act. Goldsmith countersued for declaratory judgment that the Prince Series did infringe her exclusive rights.

After reviewing the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Warhol Foundation and against Goldsmith, finding the Warhol prints constituted fair use of the original Photo, notwithstanding Warhol’s lack of license or permission for the use. In doing so, it relied on the general principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that a work is transformative if it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985). Perhaps most central to its holding, the District Court observed:

These alterations result in an aesthetic and character different from the original. The Prince Series works can reasonably be perceived to have transformed Prince from a vulnerable, uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life figure. The humanity Prince embodies in Goldsmith’s photograph is gone. Moreover, each Prince Series work is immediately recognizable as a “Warhol” rather than as a photograph of Prince – in the same way that Warhol’s famous representations of Marilyn Monroe and Mao are recognizable as “Warhols,” not as realistic photographs of those persons.

Id. at 326. Accordingly, it held Warhol’s use was sufficiently transformative to support a finding of fair use as a matter of law.

Goldsmith appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed the District Court. 11 F.4th 26 (2d. Cir. 2021). The main target of the Second Circuit’s reversal was the trial court’s holding that Warhol’s works were sufficiently transformative. “[A]s we have previously observed, an overly liberal standard of transformativeness, such as that employed by the district court in this case, risks crowding out statutory protections for derivative works.” Id. at 39. While it endorsed the District Court’s articulation of the general rule above from Campbell (a rule applied in the context of musical works of parody), the Second Circuit took a stricter view of transformativeness in this case, finding Warhol’s work retained and exploited too substantial a quantity and quality of the original photo’s features to constitute fair use such that it infringed Goldsmith’s copyright. The Warhol Foundation appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. The United States Copyright Office filed an amicus brief in support of affirming the Second Circuit.

Until the Supreme Court renders a decision, we might make two observations. First, the primary disagreement between the Second Circuit and the District Court below fundamentally pertained to “how much” a creator can borrow from another’s original work, both in terms of quantity and quality, before it would no longer qualify as fair use, and also how much weight should be accorded to a purportedly new “meaning or message” in the derivative work. The Second Circuit essentially found the Prince Series used too much of the original Photo, notwithstanding the significant changes the District Court correctly identified as Warhol’s artistic contributions. It also found that the District Court overemphasized the new meaning or message, one of cultural commentary, that Warhol’s paintings add to the original image.

Second, “there is some inherent tension in the Copyright Act between derivative works, reserved to the copyright holder, which are defined in part as works that ‘recast[ ], transform[ ], or adapt[ ]’ an original work, and ‘transformative’ fair uses of the copyrighted work by others.” Id. at 39. In this author’s view, that tension is theoretically near its peak in visual art, simply given the nature of visual works as often fixed and defined images, not easily borrowed without clear duplication of the original’s inherent elements. Thus, it may be harder for a user of another’s photograph to prove fair use as compared to other artistic mediums, because such appropriation tends to require the direct duplication of fixed, identifiable elements of an image.

Along the same lines, the author might further observe that if the Second Circuit is affirmed, photographers rejoice, because it would become just that much harder for infringement defendants to prove fair use, even in cases of partial or elemental use of original photographs. Further, affirming the Second Circuit would (in theory) give prospective users greater incentive to seek licenses and paid permission from original creators, again, especially photographers, rather than run a then higher risk of litigation and liability for infringement. On the other hand, reasonable commentators tend to speculate that an affirmance of the Second Circuit could chill artistic endeavors. But this raises further questions of the likelihood of enforcement in private, non-commercial contexts anyway, and it arguably downplays the fact that transformativeness is only part of a more holistic fair use analysis. Transformativeness remains only a sub-factor of one of the four fair use factors.

Regardless of the outcome, we will wait eagerly to see whether the Prince prints are indeed transformative, or Warhol’s work infringes.

About the author: Brady Hagan is an associate at Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and a member of the Firm’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. Before entering private practice, he clerked for Chief Justice John D. Minton, Jr. of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, and then for Senior U.S. District Judge William O. Bertelsman of the Eastern District of Kentucky. Through his judicial clerkships, Mr. Hagan handled a variety of matters and gained insight into the inner workings of both state and federal courts.

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1 As the term suggests, an “artistic reference” refers to a work or object upon which an artist bases his or her new work as an image reference.

Supreme Court Gives “Knowledge” New Meaning in Connection with Copyright Registrations

Author: Alison Pringle

When can a mistake excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration? According to the Supreme Court, a good-faith mistake of fact or law in a registration does not preclude a copyright owner from asserting a claim for infringement.

Under the US Copyright Act, copyright claimants must have a valid copyright registration before bringing a claim for infringement. If the registration contains inaccurate information, it can be determined invalid. However, while information provided in a copyright application should be accurate, the Copyright Act’s safe harbor provision in 17 U.S.C. 411(b)(1) provides that the registration is nonetheless valid unless “the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” (emphasis added.) Previously, courts had held that the statute only excused a good-faith mistake of fact, not a good-faith mistake of law.

The Court expanded this “knowledge” definition in 17 U.S.C. 411(b)(1) to a lack of either factual or legal knowledge through its recent ruling in Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 211 L.Ed.2d 586 (U.S. 2022).

Background of the Dispute

Unicolors is a textile company that offers fabrics with various artwork designs for use on garments. Unicolors then applies for copyright registrations over these designs. One such design was the “EH101” design—in 2011, Unicolors filed a single copyright application for EH101 and 30 other fabric designs and received a registration certificate.

H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., an international clothing retailer, began selling a jacket and skirt combination in 2015 with a print called the “Xue Xu” design. Soon after, Unicolors brought copyright infringement claims against H&M in the Central District of California.

Unicolors EH101 Design

H&M Xue Xu Design

At trial, a jury found for Unicolors on its infringement claim. The jury awarded Unicolors $817,920 as a disgorgment of H&M’s profits and an additional $28,800 in Unicolors’ lost profits (later reduced to $266,209.33 on remittitur, plus Unicolor’s attorneys’ fees). H&M then moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Unicolors’ copyright registration was inaccurate and thus, by extension, Unicolors’ infringement claim failed as Unicolors had no valid copyright in the EH101 design.

H&M argued Unicolors violated Copyright Office Regulation 37 CFR §202.3(b)(4), which states a single registration covers multiple works if those works were “included in the same unit of publication.” As the copyright application at issue sought registration for 31 separate designs, H&M argued the designs needed to be included in the same unit of publication. However, the designs at issue were not first offered together. Instead, some designs were marketed publically while others were marketed only to a specific customer and withheld from Unicolors’ public showroom for several months. Thus, the registration contained inaccurate information.

Unicolors took the position that it was not aware the 31 designs it was registering together did not satisfy the Act’s requirement for a “single unit of publication” when it submitted its application.

Supreme Court Opinion

The Court held that if Unicolors “was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered information in its application inaccurate,” it therefore “could not have included that information in its application with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The Court looked to other provisions of the Copyright Act and legislative history to support that “knowledge” in the context of 7 U.S.C. 411(b)(1)’s safe harbor provision means “actual, subjective awareness of both the facts and the law.”

In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Breyer made an illustrative analogy:

Suppose that John, seeing a flash of red in a tree, says, ‘There is a cardinal.’ But he is wrong. The bird is not a cardinal; it is a scarlet tanager. John’s statement is inaccurate. But what kind of mistake has John made? John may have failed to see the bird’s black wings. In that case, he has made a mistake about the brute facts. Or John may have seen the bird perfectly well, noting all of its relevant features, but, not being much of a birdwatcher, he may not have known that a tanager (unlike a cardinal) has black wings. In that case, John has made a labeling mistake. He saw the bird correctly, but does not know how to label what he saw.

Thus, the Court determined the difference between these two types of mistakes did not matter. Unicolors’ error was one of labeling (i.e., regarding the proper scope of the label “single unit of publication”). Therefore, the Court held that Unicolors’ registration was valid, and Unicolors satisfied this prerequisite for its infringement claim.

Future Implications

The impact of this ruling on copyright registrations and litigation remains to be seen, but it will have important implications for copyright applications, owners, and defendants alike. One side of the coin is reflected in the dissent, where Justice Thomas states, “The Court imposes an actual-knowledge-of-law standard that is virtually unprecedented except in criminal tax enforcement.” Generally, ignorance of the law is no excuse, but the Opinion expressly states that this principle “does not apply in this civil case concerning the scope of a statutory safe harbor that arises from ignorance of collateral legal requirements.”

On the other side of the coin, under the ruling, copyright owners appear to have more leeway to claim lack of knowledge regarding an inaccuracy in their registration applications. Nonetheless, any lack of knowledge must still be found to be in “good faith.” Willful blindness, or circumstantial evidence demonstrating an applicant was actually aware of inaccurate information, may continue to support a finding of actual knowledge.

About the author: Alison Pringle is an associate in Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. Her practice focuses on intellectual property and commercial litigation, with an emphasis on trademark, copyright, contract, technology, and privacy disputes. She also counsels clients on transactional intellectual property issues. Ms. Pringle’s biography can be found here.

SCOTUS to Review Intent Standard for Invalidation of Copyright Registrations

Author: Reid Dammann

Under the current version of the Copyright Act, registration of a copyright claim is not a condition of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). However, a certificate of copyright registration is a prerequisite to bringing a civil copyright infringement action. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). By statute, a certificate of registration satisfies this prerequisite “regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information,” unless the following two-part test is met: “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1).

Section 411(b)(2), in turn, requires that courts seek the advice of the Register of Copyrights before finding that a certificate of registration does not support an infringement action. Palmer/Kane LLC v. Rosen Book Works LLC, 188 F. Supp. 3d 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[C]ourts are in agreement that the provision is mandatory in nature[.]”) (citing DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead of relying solely on the court’s own assessment of the Register’s response to an inaccuracy, the statute obligates courts to obtain an opinion from the Register on the matter.”)). In other words, a court must first obtain the Register’s guidance before finding that the provision of knowingly inaccurate information would have caused the Register to refuse registration. Although the statute by its terms requires a referral “in any case in which inaccurate information described under [§ 411(b)(1)] is alleged,” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2), to protect against the potential for abuse inherent in this process, courts generally agree that they may first require the party seeking invalidation to establish as a factual matter that “(1) the registration application included inaccurate information; and (2) the registrant knowingly included the inaccuracy in his submission to the Copyright Office.” Palmer/Kane LLC, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 349.

Thus, before referring the issue to the Register, a court may determine whether the allegedly inaccurate information is, in fact, inaccurate. Where the factual record is insufficient to make such a determination, a court may choose to “await further factual development at the summary-judgment stage or at trial before issuing a referral.” King-Devick Test Inc. v. NYU Langone Hosps., 17-CV-930 (JPO), 2019 WL 3071935, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019). If a court ultimately determines that a registration contains inaccuracies, the Register will then “advise the court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2). The Court “must request a response from the Register before coming to a conclusion as to the materiality of a particular misrepresentation.” DeliverMed Holdings, LLC, 733 F.3d at 623-25 (discussing the “new procedure for courts confronted with a registration allegedly obtained by knowing misstatements in an application”).

Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz.1 In this case, Unicolors submitted thirty-one fabric designs to the U.S. Copyright Office, but indicated that all thirty-one designs were published as a bundle, presumably, to save fees. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a collection of works may be registered under a single-unit registration only when the works were first published in a singular, bundled unit. Here, Unicolors testified at trial that some of the designs included in the single-unit registration were published to different customers at different times, so its submission of all thirty-one images as a “collection” contained known inaccuracies. The District Court did not request the Register of Copyrights’ insight because it held that invalidation required a showing at trial that Unicolors intended to defraud the Copyright Office—which was not shown. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court on the grounds that the District Court erred by imposing an intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation and erred in concluding that Unicolors’s application for copyright registration did not contain inaccuracies despite the inclusion of confined designs. The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court, is whether 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work at issue in the subject copyright registration.

As part of its argument, Unicolors asserts that the Ninth Circuit ruling creates a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, which holds that scienter is necessary. See Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024, 1029-30 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that 411(b)(1) requires a showing of “intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information” to render a registration invalid). Unicolors argues that the Eleventh Circuit in Gordy noted that the promulgation of the PRO-IP Act, which, according to the Gordy court, “amends section 411 of the Copyright Act to codify the doctrine of fraud on the Copyright Office in the registration process,” ostensibly reaching the opposite conclusion as the H&M panel. Id.

Unicolors argues that several opinions in the Ninth Circuit have implied that there is an intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation. See L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that inaccuracies “do not invalidate a copyright… [unless] the claimant intended to defraud the Copyright Office by making the misstatement”) (quoting Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1997)); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2000).

Unicolors further argues that the Ninth Circuit’s supposed misinterpretation of 17 U.S.C. 411(b) contravenes legislative and administrative guidance, and that its position is in line with the relevant administrative and legislative bodies as well as the leading copyright treatise. According to Unicolors, these cited authorities correctly interpret that the PRO-IP Act codifies the doctrine of fraud on the Copyright Office. See U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights, Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008 12–13 (2008) (“passage of the PRO IP Act strengthens the intellectual property laws of the United States” and specifically, “it amends section 411 of the copyright law to codify the doctrine of fraud on the Copyright Office in the registration process.”); see also U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights, at 9 (2009) (Copyright Office further clarified that subsection (b) was added to section 411 “to create a new procedure for infringement actions [ . . . ] on issues that may involve fraud on the Copyright Office.”); 2 MELVILLE NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 7.20 (2018) (“[t]he legislative history for the PRO IP Act explains that the amendment aims to close the loophole whereby ‘intellectual property thieves’ argue ‘that a mistake in the registration documents, such as checking the wrong box on the registration form, renders a registration invalid and thus forecloses the availability of statutory damages’”).

Unicolors also contends that not only is there a split in the Eleventh Circuit, but also that there is a split in the Third Circuit because the Third Circuit requires an “intentional omission” of a material fact to invalidate, noting that “mere inadvertence,” is “insufficient.” See Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc. v. Wen Wu, 383 F. App’x 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Unicolors also posits that there is a further split in the Seventh Circuit, which has indicated, though not explicitly held, that 411(b)(1) requires a showing of fraud as well. In analyzing applicability of 411(b)(1), the Seventh Circuit in DeliverMed Holdings, LLC, 734 F.3d at 616, 625, fn.3, referred to the statutory provision as “the fraud on the Copyright Office inquiry” and weighed facts to determine if there was a knowing misrepresentation sufficient to seek to invalidation.

H&M’s position is that there is no circuit split, Roberts v. Gordy is an outlying case, and that this exact issue in this matter has already been presented to the United States Supreme Court, who previously denied certiorari. See Gold Value v. Sanctuary Clothing, 925 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied (no such intent-to-defraud requirement). Further, H&M argues that the statutory language is clear and that there is no need to consult legislative history. H&M argues that the plain meaning of the statute controls – stating “[a]s this Court has stated repeatedly, ‘when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end. The people are entitled to rely on the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extra-textual consideration.” Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)). The express languge of 411(b) states only that the “inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate[,]” and thefore, by the statutory plain terms, a higher degree of scienter—i.e., fraud—is not required. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A).

Intent-to-defraud requires that one willfully deceives, with intent to induce another to alter position to the other’s injury or risk. This could come in the form of an intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, concealment, or a false promise. Courts generally provide that fraud requires a misrepresentation, knowledge that the misrepresentation is false, intent to deceive, justifiable reliance by the victim, and resulting damages, so it is plain to see that a decision by the United States Supreme Court in this matter effectively determines whether it will be more difficult to invalidate a copyright registration in future copyright litigation.

About the author: Reid Dammann is a partner in Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. His practice focuses on litigation matters involving copyright, trademarks, trade secrets, and patents, with a particular emphasis on software. Mr. Dammann is a registered patent attorney with an advanced dual degree in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering. Mr. Dammann’s biography can be found here.
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1 959 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2020)

An NFT Called “Copyright Infringement”

Author: Hannah Brown

This story begins in 1982, when Andy Warhol met Jean-Michel Basquiat. Warhol and Basquait, two famous and successful artists, agreed to collaborate on an exhibition. In 1985, photographer Michael Halsband went to dinner with Basquait, which led to Halsband agreeing to photograph the poster for Basquait and Warhol’s collaborative to be titled “Paintings.”1 Halsband then took this famous picture of Warhol and Basquait on July 10, 1985:

This photo has been referred to as “perhaps one of the most iconic portraits of the two artists.”2

Fast forward to 2019, and enter New York artist CJ Hendry. Hendry is known for her realistic and incredibly detailed drawings. Hendry created an illustration based on Halsband’s photograph. Halsband sent Hendry a cease and desist letter, claiming copyright infringement.3 Halsband demanded that Hendry destroy her work. Complying, Hendry spray-painted over the piece. A screenshot of Hendry’s Instagram story shows the final result:

In fact, Hendry recorded herself spray-painting over the image with black paint:4

But, where things get really interesting is what Hendry did next. She turned the video into an NFT, or non-fungible token, and explained infra, and put it up for auction. The NFT was titled “Copyright Infringement.” As of April 16, 2021, the NFT was listed for sale at $6,685 at SuperRare.com.5 A search of SuperRare’s website shows Hendry’s NFT is no longer for sale on the site. How much the NFT sold for, if at all, is unknown.

Before diving into the issue of NFTs and Hendry’s video, the first issue is, did Hendry infringe Halsband’s work with her drawing of the photo? The answer is likely yes. Hendry creates incredible and realistic drawings. A quick look at her Instagram account shows her true talent and the realistic and detailed art that she can create with (what appears to be) colored pencils.

While an image of Hendry’s drawing of Halsband’s photograph is not available on her Instagram account, the below screenshot of her Instagram story gives us an idea of what it must have looked like:

It appears Hendry more or less reproduced the photograph in her drawing. A copyright of a work of art may be infringed by reproduction of the object itself. Home Art Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F.Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (oil painting reproduced in scarf); Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F.Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (painting reproduced by publication without consent in a magazine).

After receiving the cease and desist letter, Hendry took to Instagram to express her frustration with Halsband and his legal team, saying that she looks up to Halsband, and wondering how her drawing could not be seen as a compliment to him and his work. As noted above in her Instagram post, Hendry notes she was never going to sell the piece and was never going to profit off of it. However, a person can be liable for copyright infringement even if they have not gained profits from the infringing work. A plaintiff may recover statutory damages “whether or not there is adequate evidence of the actual damages suffered by plaintiff or of the profits reaped by defendant,” Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984), “‘to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy’ of discouraging infringement.” Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952)).6

Hendry could argue that her work was fair use of Halsband’s photograph under 17 U.S.C. § 107. In analyzing fair use, courts consider: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Id. But, as noted, Hendry did not take this issue to court and did not fight Halsband’s claim with a fair use defense. Instead, she destroyed the work and sold the video of her doing so as an NFT.

A brief explanation of an NFT is helpful. NFT stands for non-fungible token. NFTs are digital files, for example videos or digital art, and the buyer of the NFT gets to claim that they own the original digital work.7 NFTs are called “non-fungible” because they are unique, original, and cannot be interchangeable (unlike dollars bills or Bitcoin currency.) Your first thought may be: why would anyone ever pay for a digital work that they could download for free? You’re not alone in this thought, and as one author put it: “If all of this sounds bizarre, that’s because it is. The idea of paying for the symbolic ownership of a digital image that lives somewhere on the web and can be captured on a screenshot or right-click-download within seconds, is so alien it seems either idiotic or ironic.”8 But there is certainly a market for them, with videos and tweets selling for hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.9

This leads to two other questions: (1) Does Hendry’s video of her painting over her drawing created using Halsband’s photograph, constitute copyright infringement? and (2) Can Hendry then copyright that video/NFT?

The answer to the first question is: maybe. While certainly Hendry’s video of her spray painting over her work is original content, it is likely that the video contains, at least in part, an image of Halsband’s copyrighted photograph (see the image above showing the drawing as Hendry begins to paint). However, it is also possible that her use of the photograph in the video as a whole was de minimis. “For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, the use must be significant enough to constitute infringement.” Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004). “Even where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive of infringement. Some copying is permitted. In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been done to an unfair extent.” West Publ’g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y.1909). If Hendry created a lengthy video of the spray painting, and the photograph was only in a small portion of that video, it is possible that this would not constitute infringement if her use of the photo was minimal when looking at the video as a whole.

The answer to the second question is: the NFT likely meets the criteria for copyrightability, but Halsband would probably object to the NFT becoming copyrighted. To be copyrightable, a work must be original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Hendry’s video of herself is original content (non-fungible literally means original and unique). But, the video would include Halsband’s copyrighted image. A copyright including another copyrighted image could lead to issues. Indeed, Hendry even titled her work “Copyright Infringement”!

In an analogous situation: a person cannot copyright a video of themselves if that video contains another’s copyrighted song. You may have heard of Nathan Apodaca, better known as 420Doggface208, or the man who went viral while skateboarding, drinking juice, and listening to Fleetwood Mac. Apodaca attempted to mint the video of himself as an NFT. But, because the video contained copyrighted material, i.e. the song, Stevie Nicks allegedly would not agree to Apodaca creating an NFT featuring her song.10

In fact, Halsband probably could have objected to Hendry making the video into an NFT, and profiting off of it, in the first place, due to use of his photograph. Halsband had sent Hendry a cease and desist letter already, and nothing would have stopped him from doing so again, this time requesting she desist from selling the NFT in an auction. Certainly, the point of Hendry’s NFT was to destroy what Halsband deemed an infringing work, and the NFT contained an image of that work. But, as noted above, Halsband may lose due to the de minimis defense.

With NFTs becoming more and more popular and profitable, this leads to an important piece of advice for anyone looking to create an NFT: consider whether your NFT is using another’s intellectual property. This could be use of a copyrighted image or even a song within the NFT. There does not appear to be any intellectual property requirements for creating an NFT; the creator does not have to certify that their work is completely their own creation.11 There is no agency needed to “approve” or “register” the NFT like is done when one seeks to register a copyright or trademark. It is important for creators of NFTs to review their work to ensure it is their original content, or that they have the permission from the author of the work, and that nothing they are putting online will get them in trouble.

About the author: Hannah Brown is an associate and member of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group, specializing in trademark, copyright, and patent litigation. She is a former law clerk to the Hon. Janis Sammartino and Hon. Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of California.
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1 https://www.swanngalleries.com/news/photographs-and-photobooks/2020/06/the-making-of-a-portrait-michael-halsbands-photograph-of-andy-warhol-and-jean-michel-basquiat/
2 https://www.swanngalleries.com/news/photographs-and-photobooks/2020/06/the-making-of-a-portrait-michael-halsbands-photograph-of-andy-warhol-and-jean-michel-basquiat/
3 https://hypebeast.com/2021/4/cj-hendry-copyright-infringement-nft-auction-superrare-release
4 https://hypebeast.com/2021/4/cj-hendry-copyright-infringement-nft-auction-superrare-release
5 https://hypebeast.com/2021/4/cj-hendry-copyright-infringement-nft-auction-superrare-release
6 This would be different if Hendry were fighting a criminal copyright infringement claim. To prevail on an allegation of criminal copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish “infringement, that the infringement was willful, and that it was engaged in for profit.” Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bily, 4066 F. Supp. 7266, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
7https://www.theverge.com/22310188/nft-explainer-what-is-blockchain-crypto-art-faq
8 https://www.wired.com/story/nfts-boom-collectors-shell-out-crypto/
9 .
10 https://www.lamag.com/article/nft-law-copyright/
11 https://help.foundation.app/en/articles/4742869-a-complete-guide-to-minting-an-nft#:~:text=Mint%20your%20NFT%3A%20Confirm%20that,the%20same%20with%20your%20wallet.

Michael Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin et al., Case No. 20-142 (S.Ct. 2020).

Author: Richard Sybert

The greatest rock band in recorded history is back in the news. And who, hearing their music blast through the dormitory corridors of UC-Berkeley in the fall of 1969, could have predicted that a half-century later, Led Zeppelin would be at the center of a raging copyright law controversy on its way to the United States Supreme Court? Will Jimmy Page have to wear a tie?

Fresh from its sacrilege at being turned into elevator music, the band’s “Stairway to Heaven”—perhaps the closest heavy metal could ever get to a love ballad—is the subject of court rulings and a petition for certiorari filed August 11 over claims that it plagiarized the opening bars and intro from a 1967 song called “Taurus” by the band Spirit.

A Los Angeles jury cleared Zeppelin of this infringement charge in 2016. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the verdict, but it was reinstated by an en banc panel whose decision has sent shock waves roiling through the musical copyright world.

Notably, the Court of Appeal ruled that music copyright—and, therefore, analysis of infringement allegations—is limited to the deposit copy of the music on file at the Copyright Office. (All copyright registration applications must include a “deposit” at the Copyright Office of the work, or a representation of it, being copyrighted.) In the case of music copyrights, this tends to be “bare-bones,” often simple sheet music which is a far cry from the final version(s) actually produced and recorded. Put another way, the Courts will not compare the accused music against derivative versions of the copyright.

Lawyers for the estate of Spirit’s front man, which brought the suit, claimed in their cert petition to the Supreme Court that this ruling would have dire consequences for the music industry and effectively divest writers and composers (or their publishers) of copyright protection of the fruits of their labors. No doubt this is overstated, but also no doubt if this ruling stands it will represent a major change in music copyright law.

It is rare, of course, that cert petitions are accepted, which requires the votes of 4 of the 9 justices; of the 7,000 to 8,000 petitions filed each term, only about 80 are granted. Given their age, however, maybe some of the Supremes are Zeppelin fans. All we know is that right now there doesn’t seem to be a whole lotta love in the music world.

Who Owns the Ink?

Author: Jill Ormond

U.S. copyright laws provide creators the rights to (1) reproduce a work, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute copies of the work, (4) publicly perform the work, and (5) publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106.

Questions related to these rights arise when an artist creates a tattoo either from his/her design or with input from the client and then inks the tattoo on the client. What rights does the artist retain? Do any of the rights pass to the tattoo recipient? If so, what rights pass? With the increasing popularity of tattoos inked on people including celebrities who frequently appear in public and whose images are reproduced, these questions are becoming legal questions for courts to consider. Most recently, the United States District Court Southern District of New York considered these issues in Solid Oak Sketches, LLC (“Solid Oak”) v. 2K Games, Inc. and Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. (“Take-Two”), Case No. 16-CV-724-LTS-SDA. See March 26, 2020 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Solid Oak obtained exclusive copyright licenses from tattoo artists for five tattoos the artists inked on professional basketball players Eric Bledsoe, LeBron James, and Kenyon Martin. One tattoo was based on a photograph provided by a player, the other tattoos included traditional tattoo images (grim reaper, flames, basketball, stars, script, and numbers). Each was created with input from the player. The license agreement was done after the designs had been inked on the players. The rights Solid Oak licensed were not for the application of the tattoos to a person but for use in a clothing line that never came to fruition. According to the case record, Solid Oak’s owner testified that before moving forward with selling apparel he would “need permission from the players . . . to not infringe on their right of publicity.”

Take-Two is a video game developer that annually releases a basketball simulation video game that includes realistic renderings of NBA teams and players. Take-Two licenses its rights to depict the logos, uniforms, and players’ likenesses in their video games from the NBA. Solid Oak alleged that Take-Two infringed its copyrights by including the five tattoos on NBA players Eric Bledsoe, LeBron James, and Kenyon Martin appearing in its video games. After licensing the tattoo designs from the artists, Solid Oak sought to impose an obligation on the NBA players and the video game developer working with them to obtain permission from, and pay license fees to, Solid Oak because the players were realistically depicted with their tattoos in video games.

After years of discovery, experts, motions, and analysis, Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing four points. Take-Two’s initial argument was its use of the tattoos was de minimis because the tattoos were but a “fractional, fleeting part” of the game “‘creating realism’ but no more noticeable than a simulated player’s nose shape or hairstyle.’”

Take-Two next contended that its use of the tattoos was authorized by an implied license because both the tattoo artists and players understood when the tattoos were inked the players had the right to display and recreate the tattoos as part of the player’s likeness. Take-Two supported this argument with declarations from each of the tattoo artists. Also supporting this argument, Defendants established that the players gave the NBA the right to license their likeness. The NBA in turn licensed the right to the players’ likenesses to Take-Two.

Take-Two’s third argument was that judgment should be granted on its counterclaim because its use of the tattoos constituted fair use with each of the four factors—“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”—weighing in its favor.

Finally, Take-Two argued Solid Oak’s infringement claim failed because it could not establish ownership of a valid copyright since the tattoos were not independently created by the author. Instead, it presented evidence that the tattoos were copies of pre-existing works or included common elements of tattoos.

The court found Take-Two’s de minimis argument persuasive considering the average game play is unlikely to include the players with tattoos, and even when the players were included, the display of the tattoos was so small and indistinct that they could not be identified or observed. The court also noted that the tattoos were not featured in the game’s marketing materials.

Take-Two’s argument that it had an implied license for use of the tattoos because the tattoos were part of the players’ likenesses was also well-taken. Citing Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., LLC, 664 F.Supp.2d 332, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), the court concluded that an implied non-exclusive license would exist “where one party created a work at the other’s request and handed it over, intending that the other copy and distribute it.”. The court noted that the undisputed facts supported a reasonable inference that the tattoo artists necessarily granted the players nonexclusive licenses to use the tattoos as part of their likenesses, and did so prior to any grant of rights in the tattoos to Plaintiff.

Lastly, the court determined Take-Two was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its counterclaim because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that all four fair use factors weighed in favor of Take-Two and its use of the tattoos constituted fair use. Take-Two’s originality argument was considered by the court when reviewing the nature of the copyrighted work factor instead of invalidating Solid Oak’s copyright.

What’s Next?

The Southern District’s ruling could have an impact on similar cases involving the reproduction of tattoos. IP practitioners can take note of the court’s findings not only with litigation concerning tattoos but also when drafting licenses and right of publicity agreements involving tattoos and clearing rights for creative projects.

About the author: Jill Ormond is a partner in Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. Her practice focuses on litigation and transactional matters related to the entertainment industry, including film, animation, gaming, music, live performance and literary. Ms. Ormond’s biography can be found here.

SCOTUS Redefines State “Piracy”

Author: Alison Pringle

The Supreme Court recently ruled in favor of keeping state governments immune from copyright infringement lawsuits in Allen v. Cooper (Case No. 18-877). The decision affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of a videographer’s infringement claim against the state of North Carolina.

The Shipwreck Footage in Dispute

The copyrighted material at issue involved footage of wreckage from the Queen Anne’s Revenge, famed pirate Blackbeard’s ship that ran aground off North Carolina’s coast in 1718. Videographer Frederick Allen spent over a decade creating videos and photos of the ship’s underwater excavation. Allen later registered copyrights in the works.

The dispute began when North Carolina used Allen’s footage as part of an online marketing campaign. The State hosts frequent Blackbeard-festivals and its Maritime Museum features artifacts from the Queen Anne’s wreckage. The State used Allen’s works to promote its Blackbeard-related tourism.

Lower Court Rulings

Allen sued for monetary damages after the State posted his photos of the shipwreck online allegedly without payment or permission.

North Carolina argued sovereign immunity precluded Allen’s suit against the State and moved to dismiss. The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina refused to dismiss Allen’s claims but the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding Congress had not abrogated the States’ immunity from copyright infringement suits.

The Supreme Court affirmed by ruling Congress lacked a valid constitutional basis to abrogate North Carolina’s sovereign immunity under existing legislation. The ruling required a deep dive into constitutional interpretation and congressional power.

Congressional Action and Constitutional Limitations

Generally, under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, federal courts cannot hear lawsuits brought by individuals against a non-consenting state. However, a court may permit such suits if: (1) Congress has enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the States’ immunity from suit;1 and (2) a constitutional provision allows Congress to encroach on the States’ sovereignty.2

In the early 1990’s, Congress passed two acts abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity with respect to copyright and patent litigation via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (“CRCA”)3 and “Patent Remedy Act” (“PRA”)4—fulfilling the first prong for abrogation based on unequivocal statutory language.5 The remaining issue for the Allen Court was whether Congress had the power to abrogate the States’ immunity from copyright infringement suits via the CRCA.

The Court considered two constitutional provisions that would arguably allow Congress to pass such legislation: Article I, Section 8 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Congress Lacked Authority to Abrogate State Immunity Under Article I, Section 8

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known as the Constitution’s “Intellectual Property Clause,” gives Congress the power to grant copyrights and patents.6 Under this Clause, copyright holders are entitled to certain “exclusive” rights in their creations and generally have the right to exclude others from using their works without permission.

Allen argued the Intellectual Property Clause should be construed as granting Congress the power to pass legislation abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity as to copyright lawsuits. Allen contended the Intellectual Property Clause could not provide an “exclusive” right to copyright holders if government infringers could pillage their works with immunity. According to Allen, it was “antithetical” to allow any government to infringe the rights Congress has secured:

When states infringe the exclusive federal rights that Congress is charged with securing, Congress can make states pay for doing so.7

The Court rejected this argument under precedent from Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, determining that Article I did not confer such power on Congress.8

In Florida Prepaid, the Court ruled Congress lacked the power to abrogate State immunity from patent litigation pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause. Thus, the Intellectual Property Clause could not support the PRA. The Allen Court extended its Florida Prepaid ruling with respect to the CRCA: Congress could not use its Article I powers to circumvent the limits sovereign immunity places upon federal jurisdiction. In delivering the Allen opinion, Justice Elena Kagan stated:

[T]he power to ‘secur[e]’ an intellectual property owner’s ‘exclusive Right’ under Article I stops when it runs into sovereign immunity.

With the Intellectual Property Clause negated as a potential source of Congressional authority for the CRCA, the Court next turned to the Fourteenth Amendment.

The CRCA Exceeded Congress’s Authority to Abrogate State Immunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.9 As the Court acknowledged in Allen, copyrights are a form of property.

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the commands of the Due Process Clause by creating legislation limiting the States’ authority. Thus, Congress can abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity under this clause. However, this abrogation must be “congruent and proportional” to the Fourteenth Amendment injury.10 In other words, Congress must only create remedies that are a proportionate response to the constitutional rights at issue.

The Allen Court ruled the CRCA exceeded Congress’s Section Five authority because it went too far in abrogating sovereign immunity for any and every infringement suit.

The Court looked to the nature and extent of State copyright infringement at the time of the CRCA’s passing in relation to the scope of Congress’s response. The Court found the CRCA’s broad abrogation of immunity was disproportionate where Congress identified only twelve instances of State-instigated copyright infringement. Further, of those twelve instances, only two constituted willful infringement (i.e. sufficient to raise a constitutional issue.).11 In the Court’s view, these examples did not identify a serious constitutional problem justifying complete abrogation of States’ sovereign immunity against infringement claims.

The Court emphasized that, like the PRA, the CRCA was overly broad where it did not set any limits on abrogation. For example, neither statute confined abrogation to suits alleging willful infringement or infringement authorized by state policy. Rather, both the PRA and CRCA impermissibly “exposed all States to the hilt—on a record that failed to show they had caused any discernible constitutional harm (or, indeed, much harm at all).”

Consequently, the Court ruled the CRCA failed the “congruence and proportionality” test. Evidence of Fourteenth Amendment injury supporting the CRCA was “exceedingly” slight and the CRCA’s “indiscriminate scope” was too out of proportion to any due process problem.

Can States Now Use Copyrighted Material Without Permission and With Impunity?

The Allen ruling presents uncertainty for copyright holders who fear States can now use their works without permission and consequence. For example, as the ruling stands, States can theoretically upload and use copyrighted movies and music onto government websites. As Justice Breyer posited to North Carolina’s counsel during oral argument:

What the state decides to do with its own website, charging $5 or something, is to run Rocky, Marvel, whatever, Spider-Man, and perhaps Groundhog Day, all right? Now, great idea. Several billion dollars flows into the treasury. Okay? Now, if you win, why won’t that happen?12

The future of copyright law as it pertains to States is indeed unclear. However, as the Court noted in its opinion, States generally respect copyright law and intentional infringement is uncommon.13 Additionally, while States are currently immune from infringement suits for monetary damages, copyright holders may still seek an injunction against an individual state employee responsible for the infringement under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Further, any third parties who facilitate or participate in state-sponsored infringement cannot expect immunity.

The Court also suggested States might be subject to private infringement suits in the future. Justice Kagan invited Congress to create new legislation addressing State copyright infringement that, unlike the CRCA, is narrowly tailored and designed to redress or prevent unconstitutional conduct, stating:

That kind of tailored statute can effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates. Even while respecting constitutional limits, it can bring digital Blackbeards to justice.

Read the Court’s opinion in its entirety here.

Alison Pringle is an associate in Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. Her practice focuses on intellectual property and commercial litigation, with an emphasis on trademark, copyright, contract, technology, and privacy disputes. She also counsels clients on transactional intellectual property issues. Ms. Pringle’s biography can be found here.
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1 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996)
2 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 78 (2000)
3 Any State “shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment [or] any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court” for copyright infringement. 17 U. S. C. § 511(a)
4 Also known as the “Patent and Plant Variety Protection Clarification Act”
5 17 U.S.C. § 511(a); 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)
6 “The Congress shall have power … to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Article I, § 8, cl. 8.
7 Transcript of Oral Argument heard November 5, 2019, p. 3:11-14
8 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
9 Amendment XIV, § 1
10 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)
11 In Florida Prepaid and Allen, the Court defined an unconstitutional infringement as “intentional conduct” for which there is no adequate state remedy.
12 Transcript of Oral Argument heard November 5, 2019, p. 36:17-37:2
13 Copyright Office, Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment 103 (1988) (Oman Report)

Introducing the Copyright Small Claims Court

Author: Jing Zhao

On October 22, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2019, also known as “CASE.” H.R. 2426 S. 1273, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)

The Senate still has to vote on CASE before it can become law. If successful, CASE will amend title 17 of the United States Code to establish an alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) program for copyright small claims, and for other purposes. Disputes over copyright claims of relatively modest value may not be efficient in federal court. CASE’s goal is to create a simpler and more affordable judicial process for these disputes.

Here is what CASE seeks to establish.

Who are the Adjudicators?

CASE will establish a Copyright Claims Board (“Board”) in the Copyright Office that will serve as an alternative forum in which parties may voluntarily seek to resolve copyright claims. S. 1273 § 1502(a). The Board will consist of three Copyright Claims Officers. S. 1273 § 1502(b)(1). There will also be at least two Copyright Claims Attorneys to assist in the administration of the Board. S. 1273 § 1502(b)(2).

What claims would the Board review?

Only straight-forward copyright infringement-related claims and defenses, including (1) a claim for infringement; (2) a declaration of noninfringement; (3) a claim for misrepresentation in connection with a notification or counter notification; (4) respective counterclaims; (5) respective legal or equitable defense; or (6) other related claims arising out of the same infringing activity. S. 1273 § 1504(c).

Exceptions to the claims listed above are (1) claims that are pending in a court, or have been finally adjudicated in a court, (2) claims against a Federal or State governmental entity, and (3) claims against persons or entities residing outside the U.S. S. 1273 § 1504(d).

The Board may also dismiss claims that are too complex or too lengthy to administer. S. 1273 § 1505(f)(3).

What remedies would the Board be able to award?

Damages: Actual damages, profits, and statutory damages. S. 1273 § 1504(e)(1). The total monetary award is capped at $30,000 per proceeding, and $15,000 per claim. Id.

Injunctions: Injunctive relief is given in the form of an agreement between the parties, and the agreement can also include monetary awards. S. 1273 § 1504(e)(2).

Attorneys’ fees and costs up to $5,000, or costs up to $2,500 if a party appears pro se. The Board will only award fees and costs when it finds bad faith conduct. S. 1273 § 1504(e)(3).

Effect of the Board’s determination

CASE Actions are subject to judicial review. S. 1273 § 1503(g). Determination does not preclude litigation or re-litigation and should not be cited as legal precedent. S. 1273 § 1507. While a claim is before the Board, if that same claim is also being litigated in a district court, then the district court should issue a stay. S. 1273 § 1509(a).

Additional information about the ADR program

Participation in the ADR program is voluntary, and parties have the right to pursue their claims in court instead. S. 1273 § 1504(a).

Participants do not have to appear in-person. S. 1273 § 1506(c)(1). Unless physical evidence is necessary, all documents are submitted over the internet. S. 1273 § 1506(c)(2). Participants can be represented by an attorney. S. 1273 § 1506(d).

The statute of limitations for the ADR program is the same as that under the Copyright Act, 3 years. S. 1273 § 1504(b).

What other purpose does CASE serve?

The main purpose of CASE is to establish an ADR program. Its other purpose is to establish a study.

Within 3 years of the Board’s first issued determination, the Register of Copyrights shall conduct a study on the effectiveness of the Board on: (1) whether CASE needs any adjustments, particularly with respect to its claims and damages; and (2) whether the Board needs expansion to offer mediation and other ADR services. The Register of Copyrights is to report its findings to Congress.

What are the pros of CASE?

CASE would give independent creators a practical way to enforce their rights without having to hire an attorney or fight the infringement in court. Music makers and songwriters are big supporters of CASE. Other independent creators that would benefit greatly from CASE are photographers, illustrators, graphic artists, authors, bloggers, YouTubers and other types of creators and small businesses.

What are the cons of CASE?

CASE caters to less sophisticated parties, who will likely be self-represented. CASE Actions may expose these less sophisticated parties to potential abuse. For example, a CASE Action might create greater opportunities for claimants to potentially obtain settlements from unsophisticated and unrepresented defendants because many small claims do not involve damages as high as $30,000. The relatively small amount of damages at issue may deter defendants from engaging counsel and more likely to accede to settlement payments to resolve the claims.

Some observers believe that CASE may create a “default judgment mill.” An accused infringer who fails to opt-out within 60 days of receiving notice of a claim is subject to default. S. 1273 § 1506. Unsophisticated parties may not appreciate the implication of a default. However, by the same token, this opt-out provision would allow more sophisticated defendants to avoid the copyright ADR program, forcing claimants into federal court. S. 1273 § 1505(g)(1).

The effect of CASE and whether it achieves the desired results of providing a sensible, affordable forum for small value claims remains to be seen, if and when CASE is passed and signed into law and enacted.

About the author: Jing Zhao is a registered patent attorney and a member of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. Ms. Zhao has a degree in computer science, and her commercial litigation practice focuses on intellectual property and ERISA disputes, with a special interest in emerging intellectual property and other legal issues in the eSports industry. Ms. Zhao’s biography can be found here.

Supreme Court: Copyright Owners Must Register with U.S. Copyright Office Before Filing Suit

Author: Joni Flaherty

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court has held that copyright owners must register with the U.S. Copyright Office before commencing a lawsuit to enforce their rights. In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), the Supreme Court found that the Copyright Act of 1976 requires that the Copyright Office issue a certificate of registration, and that application for the certificate was not enough prior to commencing suit. The decision resolves a split among circuit courts, favoring the “registration approach” followed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, under which registration by the Copyright Office was required to proceed, and rejecting the “application approach” followed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit courts. The result turned on the interpretation of the phrase “registration of the copyright claim has been made” in Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act. That section reads:

[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.

Fourth Estate, a public benefit online news producer, licensed articles to Wall-Street.com, a news website. When the license expired and Wall-Street.com failed to remove the articles from its website, Fourth Estate brought a trademark infringement claim. Wall-Street moved to dismiss the claims on the grounds that Fourth Estate had applied for, but had not yet registered, copyrights in its articles. Interpreting Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted Wall-Street’s motion to dismiss, and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The Supreme Court affirmed, citing the practical implications of litigating prior to the Copyright Office’s grant or denial of registration. The Court found that Fourth Estate’s concerns about depriving copyright owners of the ability to timely enforce their rights was “overstated,” and given that the average registration process takes several months (seven months, on average), there was little danger that a diligent copyright owner would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Court also acknowledged exceptions to the rule, and the opportunity for copyright owners to pay an additional fee to rush their copyright application.

As a practical matter, the decision may encourage some copyright owners to promptly register their creative works. The decision may also cause a delay in some infringement suits or lead to more early dismissals of claims, and may also prevent eager litigants from adding a peripheral infringement claim for an applied-for but not yet registered copyright to a complaint.

About the author: Joni Flaherty is a partner in Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Intellectual Property and Commercial Litigation Practice Groups. Her practice focuses on intellectual property and business litigation, with an emphasis on unfair business practices, trademark claims, and contractual disputes. Ms. Flaherty’s biography can be found here.